

Questionnaire for the EUFJE Conference 2012 at the Council of State of the Netherlands *The application of European environmental law by national courts:* Finland

Part 1. The interrelation between EU (environmental) law, national law and national environmental courts

This part of the questionnaire deals with the view of national environmental courts on the interrelation between EU (environmental) law, national law and their role therein. In other words what is your view, as a national environmental court, of the EU legal order?

1.1 Introduction of the EU legal framework

It is settled case law of the ECJ that the EU forms an independent yet shared legal order. According to the European theoretical legal framework, the status of EU law 'versus' national law is dominated by three main principles: the principles of primacy, subsidiarity (art. 5(3) TEU) and of loyal cooperation (art. 4(3) TEU, also known as the general obligation of sincere cooperation). Any national (procedural) rule in conflict with Union law must be set aside or 'rendered inapplicable', also by the national courts (the so-called Simmenthal-duty (Case 106/77)). The role of a national court in the European legal order is that of a -supplementary- juge du droit commune. When legal redress is not possible before the ECJ, the national court will have to provide judicial protection of EU law in its Member State. As a European court and based on the principles of loyal cooperation and of effective legal protection, the national court has a dual task: a) to offer effective legal protection and b) to ensure the uniform application of EU law. The national court is obliged to give full effect to EU law provisions and protect rights conferred on individuals by these provisions, including if necessary the refusal of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national law. National courts have the responsibility to prevent the application of national law and decisions of administrative authorities when this is contrary to EU law. Although according to the legal fiction of the case law of the ECJ, it is for the ECJ to explain EU law and for the national courts to apply it, in practice national courts also explain EU law, if necessary assisted by the ECJ via the preliminary procedure.

1.2 Questions on the interrelation between EU (environmental) law, national law and national environmental courts

1.	I co	onsider myself	
	0	a European judge	
	0	a national judge	
	0	equally a national and European judge	
	0	a European judge, first, and then a national judge	
	X	a national judge, first, and then a European judge.	
	1	apply national law with an eye on EU legislation and case law	
2.	Wh	nat is your view of EU law in general?	
	0	Very positive	
	ΧF	airly positive	
	0	No opinion (don't know)	
	0	Fairly negative	
	0	Very negative	
3.	Wh	nat is your view of EU environmental law in general?	
	0	Very positive	
	ΧF	airly positive	
	0	No opinion (don't know)	
	0	Fairly negative	
	0	Very negative	
4.	Pro	opositions on the your view of the your role as EU court:	
	a.	I consider my constitution of a higher order than	
		i. EU treaties; no	
		ii. EU secondary law.(but a conflict that cannot be resolved by the court is unlikely)	Yes

	b. When judgments of the ECJ and the national supreme court conflict,			
I will follow the ECJ.				
	c.	The principle of loyal cooperation is a guiding principle for the		
	١	National court.	Yes?	
	The principle of loyal cooperation is questionable. I prefer to consider EU and national law to be equal in kind and apply both according to their wording, meaning and purpose.			
5.	Is th	ne relationship between EU environmental law and national law in your country		
	a. codified in your national law?			
	b.	acknowledged via national case law?	Yes	
# If yes, please indicate how:				
E.g. regarding the observance of Natura 2000 protection, the Court relies on case law of the national Supreme Administrative Court and of the ECJ, which are stricter than the implementation of the Habitats Dir Art 6 (3) i the Finnish Environmental Act				

6. What do you consider your task(s) with regard to EU law <i>and</i> do you consider these task(s) 'workable' <i>or</i> difficult:			
	a.	to set aside any national rule that is	in conflict with European law
		(the Simmenthal-obligation)?	yes
	b.	to offer effective legal protection of	European law? yes
	c.	to ensure the uniform application of	European law? Yes
leg cas	iisla se la	tion. There is no effective mechanism t	nber state influenced by national structures, practices and process ensure absolute uniformity. Besides, the body of EU law and tand in a national context. All three tasks are at their best,
		uestions on the role of EU law in nation	nal environmental cases court decide in the period 1 January 2011 - 1 January 2012?
	Ple	ase indicate the total number: 695	
8.	In l	now many of these cases:	
	a.	was EU (environmental) law at issue?	
		50-75%	
	b.	was this EU law actually applied (take	n into account)?
		25-50%	
	c.	was this EU law the basis of your cou	rt's decisions?
		1-10%	
9.	Ple	ase provide insight in the type of cases	in which the EU law was at issue:
	a.	Civil cases:	Never
	b.	Criminal cases:	(not applicable in the adm. court)
	c.	Administrative cases:	regularly
		i.general cases:	rarely
		ii. environmental cases:	mainly
		iii.planning law cases:	regularly

d.	Differentially:	?	
# If diff	ferently, please s	pecify	
# Pleas	se indicate your t	vpe of court:	
0	civil court	7,500.00	
0	criminal court		
X	administrative co	purt	
	o general adr	ministrative court	
	X environment		
	o planning la	w court	
0	differentially:		
	ich EU law was at		
0	Access to infor	mation/consultation/court	
ΧE	nvironmental im	pact assessment (such as EIA)	
ΧIı	X Industrial emissions (IPPC/IED)		
0	o Industrial accidents (post Seveso)		
χV	Vater		
0		Air	
0		Noise	
0		Products	
0		Chemicals	
0		New technologies (Bio-/nanotechnology)	
0		Nuclear	
ΧN	lature protection	1	
χV	Vaste manageme	ent	
0		Climate change	
0		Renewable energy	
0		Differentially,	

11. Please provide insight in the type of legal questions in which this EU (environmental) legislation was at issue in these cases:

0	Procedural o	questions:	rarely
	X access	to justice	
	o lega	l remedies (reparation)	
	o diffe	erently, namely	
0	Material no	rms:	regularly
	X legalit	y of national law	
	X legalit	y of decisions/actions/sanctions imposed	d by national authorities
	o leg	ality of EU law	
0	Differently	y, namely	
	o Differ	ently,	
12.	Please pro	ovide insight how the EU law entered the	environmental case law. Was it relied on by:
	C	individuals	regularly
	C	companies	regularly
	C	NGOs	regularly
	C	the legislature	regularly
	C	national public authorities	regularly
	C	official third parties to the dispute	regularly
	C	differently:	

Part 2. The use of the ECJ mechanisms of application of EU law

2.1 Introduction of EU legal framework

This part of the questionnaire specifically focusses on the application of EU environmental directives in the cases your court decided in the period 1 January 2011 - 1 January 2012 in which EU law was at issue, as mentioned under 1.3.

Contrary to regulations and decisions, EU directives are never directly applicable in the legal order of a Member State upon their coming into effect (art. 288 TFEU). Directives are binding for the Member States as to the result which they aim to achieve and in principle require national implementation measures (art. 288 (3) TFEU). The implementation obligation of the Member States for directives consists of the duty to a) transpose its provisions in national law; b) to apply and c) to enforce the application of the directive —or the national implementation law- (art. 288 TFEU) and d) to offer effective legal protection (art. 19 TEU). The ECJ developed three —by now traditional- mechanisms to i) remedy flaws in the implementation (solve —potential- conflicts between national and Union law), and ii) so ensure the application (full effectiveness) of the directives irrespective of their nature and iii) give redress to individuals who consider themselves wronged by conduct amounting to fault on the part of the Member States. These mechanisms are: consistent interpretation, direct effect, and state liability, each with its own set of criteria and restrictions, to be applied in this order.

Consistent interpretation: When applying national law, national courts are obliged to interpret the whole body of rules of national law as far as possible in consistency with Union law. Consistent means 'in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive'. '[I]f the application of interpretative methods recognized by the national law enables, in certain circumstances, a provision of domestic law to be construed in such a way as to avoid conflict with another rule of domestic law, or the scope of that provision to be restricted to that end by applying it only in so far as it is compatible with the rule concerned, the national court is bound to use those methods in order to achieve the result sought by the directive.' This duty of consistent (or harmonious) interpretation applies:

- o to all national law, whether adopted before or after the directive in question;
- o to all Union law; and
- o In all kinds of relationships involved (including horizontal, inverse vertical).

However, the ECJ has limited the application of consistent interpretation via general principles of law, in particular the principles of legal certainty and non-retroactivity and the interpretation of national law *contra legem*.

Direct effect: Direct effect means that individuals can directly invoke a provision of primary or secondary Union law in the national legal order, including before a court). Whether a provision has direct effect depends on three conditions: 1) the EU legal instrument in which the provision is contained; 2) the content of the provision; and 3) the type of relationship involved.

Provisions of directives, as a rule, lack direct effect (ad 1), but they can have direct effect when they are sufficiently precise and unconditional (ad 2). Contrary to provisions of the Treaties and regulations, provisions of directives can only have direct effect in vertical relations and not in horizontal or inverse vertical relations (ad 3). However the latter was opened up for the so-called triangular relations in the case *Wells*, where Mrs. Wells (the plaintiff), appealed against a decision of a national public authority to grant a permit to a mining company (third party, here the permit holder), arguing that a provision of the EIA directive was breached by this decision (Case C-201/02). The ECJ decided that in such cases individuals can successfully invoke the direct

effect of the provisions of directives, as they are then applied vertically and *not* horizontally or inverse vertically, as invoking the directive merely had adverse horizontal side-effects. The negative effects for the mining company of the direct effect of the directive did not directly stem from the directive, but from the authorities' failure to fulfill its obligations under the directive.

When provisions in directives are not sufficiently precise and unconditional due to leaving a discretion to the Member States, they still can be applied by the national courts. The national court then must examine whether the national I public authority/legislator stayed within the margin of discretion left to the Member States in the EU law when exercising its powers (the so-called *Kraaijeveld*-test or legality review (Case C-72/95)). This test can perceived as a form of direct effect

During the implementation period: One final remark with regard to the mechanisms of consistent interpretation and direct effect is that they only apply with regard to directives once the period for transposition has expired. During the implementation period Member States 'must refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to compromise the attainment of the result prescribed by that directive'. The courts are to apply this test (the so-called *Inter-Environnement*-test (Case C-129/96)). The ECJ has applied it also for other transitional regimes in directives.

State liability: When the former two mechanisms fails and a provision of a directive cannot used by the national court via consistent interpretation or direct effect, state liability is the mechanism of last resort. But the European principle of state liability (also known as Francovich-liability (Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90)) can also be used as a separate mechanism to remedy infringements of Union law, such as the failure to implement directives correctly (transpose, apply, enforce). State liability of a Member State covers infringements by all the national authorities, including violation of EU law by the highest national courts (Köbler, Case C-224/01). The ECJ has set minimum- criteria, under which a Member State is to be considered liable before a national court. The criteria of the European principle of state liability for failure to implement directives are three-fold. Required are a) a sufficient serious breach of Union law; b) of a rule intended to confer rights on individuals; and c) a direct causal link between breach and damage. Except for the criteria as such (the right to reparation when the criteria are met), the EU mechanism of state liability must be applied (given effect) within the national procedural framework, including how an action for a breach of EU law is classified, the exact nature or degree of the infringement required for state liability, and the extent of reparation. Yet this national procedural framework is subject to the EU limitations of equivalence and effectiveness (see par. 4). When found liable, Member States are required to make good damages caused to individuals through implementation failures. Although reparation must cover the loss or damage sustained so as to ensure effective protection, the national law on liability provides the framework within which the State must mate reparation for the consequences of the loss and damage caused, provided this is in accordance with the aforementioned EU limitations

2.2 Questions on the application of the EU mechanisms to apply EU directives

13	3. Please estimate how often your court considered an EU environmental directive not or incorrectly
	implemented, differentiating between the 3 elements of implementation
	(transposition/application/enforcement) in the cases in which EU law was at issue in the period 1 January
	2011-1 January 2012?

0	Transposition:	rarely
0	Application:	rarely

0	Enforce	ment:	rarely		
-	-	ase illustrate the judicial practice and reasonin a sketch of a typical national environmental ca	g used to verify the implementation of EU law ase)		
and the will be overloo the Dir say so.	In a typical case, parties opposing an application for environmental permit will claim a) that by national law and the EIA Directive, impact must be assessed, b) that species or habitats protected by the Habitats Directive will be affected by the project and a permit cannot be granted, and c) that effects on Natura sites have been overlooked or not properly assessed. As to a), the Court has, in at least one case, deemed that according to the Directive, EIA is required, even though the national EIA Act implementing the Directive does not explicitly say so. As to b), the Court often remits the case to first instance for a more thorough investigation. With respect to c) the Court adheres to the rulings of the ECJ and the national Supreme Adm. Court				
the	period 1 .	te as an estimate over the total number of cas January 2011-1 January 2012, which of the thr on or incorrect implementation of (environm	ree mechanisms was/were applied by your court		
a.	Consiste	nt interpretation:			
		1-10%			
b.	Direct ef	fect (including the 'Kraaijeveld-test'):			
		0-1%			
c.	State liab	pility:			
		0-1%			
d.	During th	ne transposition/ transitional periods: the 'Inte	er-Environnement test'		
		0-1%			
e.	Different	tly, namely			
15. ln ք	general, do	you use one or more of these mechanisms w	ithin one case?		
	0	One mechanism, or			
	ΧN	Aultiple mechanisms			
Please	explain7	The court considers ex officio the legality of the	administrative process , as well as the parties'		

16. In general, if any, what is your court's order of preference:

consideration.

X Consistent interpretation/direct effect

 ${\it claims.}\ {\it Therefore\ all\ aspects\ of\ implementation,\ application\ and\ enforcement\ of\ EU\ law\ arise\ for$

	0	Direct effect/consistent interpretation	
	0	Consistent interpretation/direct effect/state liability	1
	0	Direct effect/consistent interpretation/state liability	1
	0	Differently, namely	
	possible, ple erence	ease indicate what the particular legal & practical argu	ments are for your court's order of
prov	visions, inter	nmental law leaves ample scope of deliberation to the rpreting them against the background of Directive air f direct effect are strict and seldom fulfilled.	
	· ·	ourt use directives when the transposition period or treed (including when the case concerns 'infringements'	•
ā	a. During t	the transposition period	Yes
ŀ	o. During (other transitional periods (such as extension periods)	Yes
# <i>If</i> y	yes, please o	explain, if possible, why and how (by illustrating the lir	ne of reasoning used in such cases:
usef	^f ul	e, when applying ambiguous or lacking national rules,	How:
	· ·	also indicate, as an estimate, how often this occurred in y 2011- 1 January 2012 in which EU law was at issue?	in the total cases of your court in the
0-1%	6		
18.	concludes, the EU obl	crete legal options (judicial decisions/remedies) does y , on the basis of the EU mechanisms, that a EU directive ligation to set aside any national rule that conflicts wit so you and indicate for which EU mechanism they are a	ve was breached, in particular in view of h EU law? Please select the options
	Your court	is allowed to:	
	X to set asi	de (not apply) the conflicting national rule	
		consistent interpretation	n; direct effect
	X to declare	e that EU law was breached	
		consistent interpretation	n; direct effect
	o to forc	e the legislature to act	
		give an order to adopt legislation	

o to annul decisions	
X to revoke a consent already granted	
	consistent interpretation; direct effect;
X to suspend a consent already granted	I
	consistent interpretation; direct effect
X to award damages	
	consistent interpretation; direct effect
X monetary compensation	
	consistent interpretation; direct effect;
X factual reparation	
	consistent interpretation; direct effect
X to offer interim relief	
	consistent interpretation; direct effect/
 to alter (break through) national examples an exhaustive number of grounds 	khaustive mandatory assessment systems, for instance by widening for refusing permits
o differently	
If differently,	
2.3 Questions on the application of consist	ent interpretation
19. Proposition: the mechanism of consiste	nt interpretation is an advantageous principle.
I agree	
20. Does your court also use the mechanism request this)?	n of consistent interpretation <i>ex officio</i> (when parties did not Yes
	chanism of consistent interpretation considered non usable by your e in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012?

o give order to act in a specific way

Never

0	other general principles of law		
0	contra legem interpretation		
0	the parties involved:		
	0	because the national public authority relied on consistent interpretation of the directive to the detriment of a citizen, where there was no formal third party:	
	0	because the national public authority relied on consistent interpretation of the directive to the detriment of a citizen, where there was a formal third party:	
	0	in criminal proceedings, when consistent interpretation would have had the effect of determining of aggravating, directly the liability in criminal law:	
0	differer	ntially, namely	
# If poss	sible, ple	ase illustrate the reasons why consistent interpretation was not usable (the limitations)	
2011-1		ite, in how many of the cases of your court where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2012, did your court use interpretations of EU law by other national courts, including those of states?	
0	Use of i	interpretation by other courts of your country	
	25-509	%	
0	Use of i	interpretation by national courts of other Member States	
	0-1%		
# Please	e, if possi	ble, illustrate when in particular the latter was the case.	
		foreign national courts are not used as legal sources in Court decisions, but they are sometimes round for deliberation when correct interpretation of EU law is at issue	
	e indicate Iember S	e whether there is a <i>need for information</i> on the interpretations of EU law by national courts of itates? Yes	
2.4 Que	stions o	n the application of direct effect	
23.	Propos	sitions:	
0	The me	chanism of direct effect is an advantageous principle.	
l a _i	I agree		

the principle of legal certainty

neu	eutral		
	ase estimate how often your court establish the direct e er courts, in the case law where EU law was at issue in th	•	
0	Use of case law of other courts of your country		
	1	Never	
0	Use of case law of national courts of other Member St	tates	
	1	Never	
# Please	se, if possible, illustrate when in particular <i>the latter</i> is th	ne case.	
	se indicate whether there is a <i>need for information</i> on the onal courts of other Member States?	e use of direct effect of EU environmental law	
		Yes	
whethe	w often, as an estimate, did your court apply the mecha er the national public authorities stayed within the marg where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011-:	gin of discretion of provisions of directives) in the	
	ı	Never	
	w often, as an estimate, was the mechanism of direct ef where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011-:		
	,	mainly	
	e mechanism of <i>consistent interpretation</i> (direct effect?) indicate the reasons <i>why</i> :	was considered non usable in these cases,	
0	Reason of legal certainty:	never	
0	Prohibition of inverse direct effect (national public au	thority <i>versus</i> individual (incl. company/NGO)): never	
0	Prohibition of horizontal direct effect (individual vers	us individual):	
	ı	never	
0	Adverse horizontal side-effects of direct effect (Wells)		
	1	never	
0	Differentially, namely		

o The criteria to establish whether or not a provision has direct effect are workable?

# If possible, please illustrate these reasons (the limitations), in particular of restrictions related to triangular situations (e.g. where the plaintiff (an individual) appeals, relying on EU law, against a decision of a national public authority granting a permit to another individual (the (in-) formal third party)				
Direct effect is the extreme of consistent interpretation. I do not think the two should be thought of as separate categories				
Would you limit the use of the mechanism of direct effect by a national public authority in a case between this authority and a company, regarding the refusal of this authority to grant an environmental permit to this company, based -ex officio- directly on a provision in a directive, when there are potentially, but not formally third parties, involved?				
28. Would your court ex officio apply a provision of a directive that has direct effect (is sufficiently clear and precise) in a case where there are potentially third parties (such as NGOs protecting general interest of the environment) but none of these parties is formally party to the case? Yes				
2.5 Questions on the application of State liability				
29. Proposition: the mechanism of EU state liability is an advantageous mechanism.				
I agree				
30. Is there also a national instrument of state liability for violations of EU law? no				
# If yes, how often, as an estimate, was the national instrument of state liability used by your court in the cases where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011- 1 January 2012?				
# If yes, please respond to the following proposition: I prefer the national instrument of state liability over the EU mechanism.				
# Please indicate why:				
 Less stringent criteria 				
More stringent criteria				
More clarity criteria				
 Experience 				

o Request parties

Please explain: ...

o Differentially,

I think that under Finnish law, the State may be held liable for losses incurred by a private party through
incorrect implementation of Directives. The question has not been raised in the Adm. Court.

31. In general, has the EU mechanism (or national instrument) of state liability ever been used for infringements of EU law by national courts for their judicial decisions (*Köbler*) in your country?

no

If yes,

- o did these judicial decisions concern environmental cases?
- o did they ever concern your court's judicial decisions?

If possible, please illustrate.....

32. Has an action based on the EU mechanism of state liability for an infringement of EU law ever been successful in the environmental case law of your court? **No case yet**

If no,

 has an action based on the *national* instrument of state liability for an infringement of EU law ever been successful in the environmental case law of *your court*?

don't know

by your knowledge, has an action based on the EU mechanism of state liability ever

been successful in the environmental case law of your country?

don't know

o by your knowledge, has as an action based on the *national* instrument of state liability for infringements of *national law* in environmental case law ever been successful in *your country*?

don't know

33. Does your court require from individuals (incl. companies/NGO's) that they minimize the damages they claim via a state liability action, meaning that they first should have relied on directly effective provisions of EU law in for instance an administrative procedure (make use of the legal remedies available)?

?

Part. 3. The (non)use of the preliminary procedure

3.1 Introduction of EU legal framework

The relationship between the EU courts, the ECJ and the national (environmental) courts, is codified in art. 267 TFEU (art. 234 TEC) on the preliminary procedure. When national courts encounter problems with the application of EU law they can or must request the ECJ for an interpretation of EU law, when the national court 'deems such an interpretation [of primary or secondary EU law] necessary for deciding a specific case'. The preliminary procedure may also concern the legality of secondary EU law as national courts are not allowed to rule on the legality of secondary EU law. Courts whose decisions can be appealed, have discretion to use the preliminary procedure, but national courts of last resort must refer. The national courts of last resort are merely relieved from this obligation to refer in case of: an *acte clair* or *acte éclaire*, being if the EU law is

sufficiently clear respectively the legal issue has already been addressed by the ECJ (*Cilfit*, Case 283/81). Non-reference by the national court in last resort can result in EU state liability (*Köbler*).

3.2 Questions on the application of the preliminary procedure

34. Proposition: the preliminary procedure is a very useful.

neutral

Preliminary ruling is an anomaly: the message to national courts is that as they cannot apply EU law correctly anyway, they had better ask beforehand. EU law can be applied by national courts as any other law, and faulty interpretation is corrected over time through the decisions of higher courts, including the ECJ. Suspending proceedings for the duration of a preliminary ruling threatens the parties' right to an expedient decision.

.....

35. How many references for preliminary rulings were made in environmental cases in your country in the period 1 January 2008-1 January 2012? ?

How many of these references where made by your court? none

36. What type(s) of preliminary questions were referred by your court?

Questions on:

- o the interrelation between procedural law (procedural autonomy) and EU law
- o the use of the EU mechanisms of application of EU law
- o material (environmental) EU law (for instance on interpretation, the interrelation between EU legal provisions)
- o differently namely,

37. Please estimate in how many of the cases of your court where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012, did the parties ask your court to request a preliminary question?

1-10%

When these requests are turned down, are the reasons always stated in the ruling (for instance in a separate court decision)?

Yes

...Reasons are stated in the ruling. If the Court found it necessary to request a preliminary ruling, this would be done in an interim decision.

.....

38. Has your court ever withdrawn preliminary references in environmental cases in the period 1 January 2008-1 January 2012? **no**

In this period have your court's preliminary questions been:

o left unanswered by the ECJ?

no

0	rephrased your court's preliminary questions in such a way	
	that they were no longer relevant for the referring case?	no
# If yes,	please indicate the number of cases where this occurred, and, if possible	e, illustrate
39. although	Does your court wait for the 'perfect' case to refer a (number of) specifn the legal questions concerning EU law are already raised in other (earli	
		/no
# If poss	ible, please explain,	
40. Whe	en a question requiring preliminary ruling is raised in a certain case does ings:	your court stay the
0	In that certain case:	no
0	In all other cases pending, where this question is relevant:	no
# Does y referred	our court stay the proceedings in a case when there are–for that case re :	elevant- preliminary questions
0	by other courts of your country:	no
0	by courts of other countries:	no
41.	Can the national (environmental) court always use the preliminary rulin	ng in the referring case? Yes
42. Does	s your court use are the preliminary rulings beyond the referring cases?	Yes
43. Doe Member	s your court use the preliminary rulings based on referrals by other cour States?	rts, including those of other Yes
	you ever in hindsight incorrectly decide not to refer a preliminary quest red the Union law was irrelevant for the case or the relevant Union law v	•
# If yes,	did it give rise to an (EU) action of state liability (Köbler-claim)?	
# Would	you be able, according to national (procedural) law to repair such a cou	rt decision?
#If possi	ble, please explain,	

4.1 Introduction of the EU legal framework

The application of EU (environmental) law by national courts occurs within the context of national procedural law. National procedural law regulates *inter alia* the access to the court, the burden of proof, the intensity of judicial review, and the remedies offered by these courts. National procedural law however faces EU restrictions, as the national procedural law of 27 Member States —potentially — distorts the application of EU law.

These restrictions can be found in formal harmonization in EU law, for instance the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus), and in case law of the ECJ. The proposed directive to implement the so-called third-pillar of Aarhus, on access to justice, has (still) not been adopted, but it has been implemented in part, particularly in the context of the EIA and IPPC-directives (2003/35/EC and 2003/4/EC). Recently landmark cases on Aarhus clearly limited the procedural autonomy on access to justice in environmental law. Specific harmonization can also be found in the Eco crime- and Eco liability-directives (2008/99/EC and 2004/35/EC).

In so far as there is no harmonization the general restrictions of the national procedural autonomy apply. These three general restrictions, which are principles based on standard ECJ case law, form the outer boundaries of national procedural law in 'EU law'- cases. There are the two 'mild' *Rewe*-principles, consisting of a) the principle of equivalence: national rules cannot be applied if they are less favorable if applied to cases involving the application of EU law than to comparable cases concerning only national law; and b) the principle of effectiveness: national rules cannot be applied if they make it (practically) impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law (Case 33/76). Violations of the principle of effectiveness can be justified by general principles of law such as legal certainty and the rights of defense (the so-called procedural 'rule of reason' or balancing test). The third restriction is the principle of effective legal protection, which requires an effective access to a court *as well* as an adequate system of remedies in place in the Member States in order to give effect to EU law (codified in article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and art. 19 TEU). This final principle has on occasion also resulted in new types of legal remedies.

National courts will have to check whether these principles restrict the application of national procedural rules in the cases before them (check if 'EU-proof'). The case law of the ECJ on the restrictions of national procedural law covers a wide range of procedural rules, varying from the access to justice (e.g. standing requirements, time limits, ex officio application of EU law), the burden of proof, the intensity of judicial review, and the remedies (types of court procedures and the types of legal effects). Several uncertainties however still remain with regard to the aforementioned restrictions, for instance on the relationship between the *Rewe* principles and the 'intensive' principle of effective legal protection; the role of the procedural rule of reason, as well as legal consequences of a breach of the restrictions, except for the *Simmenthal*-duty to set them aside.

4.2 Questions on the application of EU restrictions of the procedural autonomy

45. Please estimate in how many of the cases of your court in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012 where EU law was at issue, did the EU restrictions of the national procedural autonomy play a role:

0-1%

46. Please estimate in how many of the cases of your court in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012 where EU law was at issue did you consider any national procedural rule **not** to be 'EU-proof'

0-1%

If possible, please specify which of following restrictions played a role in this case law:

	0	The <i>prin</i>	inciple of equivalence	
	0	The prin	nciple of effectiveness	
	XΤ	The <i>princi</i>	iple of effective legal protection	
	X A	Aarhus	(including the Aarhus-case law by the ECJ	
	0	Seconda	dary legislation:	
		0	Directive 2003/4 (Access to info)	
		0	Directive 2003/35 (Public participation)	
		0	Eco-liability directive 2004/35	
		0	Eco-crime directive 2008/99	
	0	Europea	ean Convention on Human Rights	
	0	Differer	ntly,	
# P	leas	e illustrat	te the relevant generally used legal considerations in your case law:	
47.			cimate in how many of the cases referred to in question 57 did you find a justif e procedural rule?	fication for the
		0-1%		
		Please s	specify the justification you found (use)?	
		0	the procedural rule of reason (general principles of law)	
			legal certainty	
			rights of defense	
		0	differently,	
••••				
48.			ur knowledge of <i>current</i> national (procedural) law that is/could be infringing ts, with regard to:	he EU
		a. ac	ccess to justice: /no/	,
			standing requirements:time limits:	
			o court fees,	
			o court fees,	

	0	length of proceedings:	
	0	ex officio application of EU law	
0	tł	he intensity of judicial review and	/no/
0	b	urden of proof	/no/
0	le	egal remedies:	/no/
	0	types of judicial review (legal review or claims so	olely based on breach of Union law)
	o de	the judicial competences (the types of judgment eliver (sanctioning/legal redress) & aim of judicial review	·
0	d	lifferently,	
# To your know	vledg	ge is there any future national (procedural) law that coul	d infringe the EU restrictions? /no
# If yes, please	expl	lain	
_		e ECJ case law on the national procedural law a <i>national</i> view what has the impact been of this case law on your on the None	
# If possible, pl	lease	e illustrate	

If judges from different courts from the same member state are participating each of them can fill in the questionnaire as his or here court is concerned

Please send your answers to the general rapporteur Ms. Liselotte Smorenburgvan Middelkoop as soon as possible and **on September 10**th **at the latest** (answers received after that date cannot be incorporated in het general report): L.vanMiddelkoop@uva.nl



Questionnaire for the EUFJE Conference 2012 at the Council of State of the Netherlands *The application of European environmental law by national courts:* Finland (mr. Kuusiniemi)

Part 1. The interrelation between EU (environmental) law, national law and national environmental courts

This part of the questionnaire deals with the view of national environmental courts on the interrelation between EU (environmental) law, national law and their role therein. In other words what is your view, as a national environmental court, of the EU legal order?

1.1 Introduction of the EU legal framework

It is settled case law of the ECJ that the EU forms an independent yet shared legal order. According to the European theoretical legal framework, the status of EU law 'versus' national law is dominated by three main principles: the principles of primacy, subsidiarity (art. 5(3) TEU) and of loyal cooperation (art. 4(3) TEU, also known as the general obligation of sincere cooperation). Any national (procedural) rule in conflict with Union law must be set aside or 'rendered inapplicable', also by the national courts (the so-called Simmenthal-duty (Case 106/77)). The role of a national court in the European legal order is that of a -supplementary- juge du droit commune. When legal redress is not possible before the ECJ, the national court will have to provide judicial protection of EU law in its Member State. As a European court and based on the principles of loyal cooperation and of effective legal protection, the national court has a dual task: a) to offer effective legal protection and b) to ensure the uniform application of EU law. The national court is obliged to give full effect to EU law provisions and protect rights conferred on individuals by these provisions, including if necessary the refusal of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national law. National courts have the responsibility to prevent the application of national law and decisions of administrative authorities when this is contrary to EU law. Although according to the legal fiction of the case law of the ECJ, it is for the ECJ to explain EU law and for the national courts to apply it, in practice national courts also explain EU law, if necessary assisted by the ECJ via the preliminary procedure.

1.2 Questions on the interrelation between EU (environmental) law, national law and national environmental courts

1.	I consider myself				
	o a European judge				
	o a national judge				
	o equally a national and European judge				
	o a European judge, first, and then a national judge				
	x a national judge, first, and then a European judge.				
Th	e starting point is national legislation, but the relevance of EU legislation (and case law) is	s always recognised			
2.	What is your view of EU law in general?				
	o Very positive				
	x Fairly positive				
	O No opinion (don't know)				
	o Fairly negative				
	 Very negative 				
3.	What is your view of EU environmental law in general?				
	 Very positive 				
	x Fairly positive				
	 No opinion (don't know) 				
	 Fairly negative 				
	 Very negative 				
4.	Propositions on the your view of the your role as EU court:				
	a. I consider my constitution of a higher order than				
	i. EU treaties;	no			
	ii. EU secondary law.	no (?)			
	b. When judgments of the ECJ and the national supreme court conflict,				
	I will follow the ECJ.	Yes			
	c. The principle of loyal cooperation is a guiding principle for the				
	National court.	Yes			
aii	. A conflict is, in practice, unthinkable and they can be applied simultaneously				
5.	Is the relationship between EU environmental law and national law in your country				
	a. codified in your national law?	no			
	b. acknowledged via national case law?	Yes			

If yes, please indicate how:

We have e.g. several cases of the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) where interpretations of ECJ have in fact superseded the wording of national law (e.g. the Waddenzee formula which is rather distant from the national section implementing Art 6(3) of the Habitats Directive has been adopted in national case law and national law

concerning locus standi has been interpreted in the light of ECJ judicature concerning Aarhus Convention and the amended EIA Directive)		
6. W	-	aw and do you consider these task(s) 'workable' or
a. b.	to set aside any national rule that is in conflict w (the <i>Simmenthal</i> -obligation)? to offer effective legal protection of European la	No
c.	to ensure the uniform application of European I	aw? No
	rinciples are clear but in practice it is not always ea rm application of EU law	sy to boast about being able to guarantee e.g. the
1.3 <u>Q</u>	Questions on the role of EU law in national environ	mental cases
Ple	an estimate, how many cases did your court decid ease indicate the total number: 4225 of which rough ocluding land use planning and building, hunting, fis	hly 20 per cent environmental cases in a wide sense
8. In	how many of these cases (of these 20 per cent i.e.	some 850 environmental cases) :
a.	was EU (environmental) law at issue?	
	25-50%;	
	was this EU law actually applied (taken into acco	ount)?
	10-25%;	
b.	was this EU law the basis of your court's decision	s?
	1-10%;	
9. Ple a.	ease provide insight in the type of cases in which th Civil cases:	e EU law was at issue: Never
b.	Criminal cases:	Never
c.	Administrative cases:	Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, all
	i.general cases:	regularly
	ii.environmental cases:	mainly
	iii.planning law cases:	regularly (e.g. Habitat and Bird
d.	Directives) Differentially:	Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, all
u.	Differentially.	recoer, raicity, regularity, mainly, an
# If dif	fferently, please specifyMy court is an administra	tive court where no civil or criminal cases are
heard		
# Plea	se indicate your type of court:	
0	civil court	

0	administrative court	
	x general administrative court	
	o environmental court	
	o planning law court	
0	lier II	
	·	
10. Ple	ease provide insight in the top 5 of the most relevant topi	cs in EU environmental legislation in the cases in
wh	nich EU law was at issue:	
0	Access to information/consultation/court	
x	Environmental impact assessment (such as EIA)	
x	Industrial emissions (IPPC/IED)	
0	Industrial accidents (post Seveso)	
0	Water	
х	Air	
0	Noise	
0	Products	
0	Chemicals	
0	New technologies (Bio-/nanotechnology)	
0	Nuclear	
x	Nature protection	
х	Waste management	
0	Climate change	
0	Renewable energy	
0	Differentially,	
	,,	
11.	Please provide insight in the type of legal questions ir	which this EU (environmental) legislation was
at issue	in these cases:	, , ,
0	Procedural questions:	regularly
	x access to justice	,
	 legal remedies (reparation) 	
	o differently, namely	
0	Material norms:	regularly/mainly
· ·	x legality of national law	
	x legality of decisions/actions/sanctions imposed b	v national authorities
	o legality of EU law	,
0	Differently, namely	
Ü	o Differently,	Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, all
	o Binerentity,	
12.	Please provide insight how the EU law entered the en	vironmental case law. Was it relied on hy:
12.	x individuals	regularly
	x companies	mainly
	x NGOs	mainly
	x the legislature	mainly
	x national public authorities	mainly
		-
	x official third parties to the dispute	mainly, all
	o differently:	never, rarely, regularly, mainly, all

criminal court

Concerning the legislature I understood the question so that legislature has, in enacting the law, taken EU law into account; the legislature cannot, of course, otherwise take part in environmental cases in Courts.....

Part 2. The use of the ECJ mechanisms of application of EU law

2.1 Introduction of EU legal framework

This part of the questionnaire specifically focusses on the application of EU environmental directives in the cases your court decided in the period 1 January 2011 - 1 January 2012 in which EU law was at issue, as mentioned under 1.3.

Contrary to regulations and decisions, EU directives are never directly applicable in the legal order of a Member State upon their coming into effect (art. 288 TFEU). Directives are binding for the Member States as to the result which they aim to achieve and in principle require national implementation measures (art. 288 (3) TFEU). The implementation obligation of the Member States for directives consists of the duty to a) transpose its provisions in national law; b) to apply and c) to enforce the application of the directive —or the national implementation law- (art. 288 TFEU) and d) to offer effective legal protection (art. 19 TEU). The ECJ developed three —by now traditional- mechanisms to i) remedy flaws in the implementation (solve —potential- conflicts between national and Union law), and ii) so ensure the application (full effectiveness) of the directives irrespective of their nature and iii) give redress to individuals who consider themselves wronged by conduct amounting to fault on the part of the Member States. These mechanisms are: consistent interpretation, direct effect, and state liability, each with its own set of criteria and restrictions, to be applied in this order.

Consistent interpretation: When applying national law, national courts are obliged to interpret the whole body of rules of national law as far as possible in consistency with Union law. Consistent means 'in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive'. '[I]f the application of interpretative methods recognized by the national law enables, in certain circumstances, a provision of domestic law to be construed in such a way as to avoid conflict with another rule of domestic law, or the scope of that provision to be restricted to that end by applying it only in so far as it is compatible with the rule concerned, the national court is bound to use those methods in order to achieve the result sought by the directive.' This duty of consistent (or harmonious) interpretation applies:

- \circ to all national law, whether adopted before or after the directive in question;
- o to all Union law; and
- o In all kinds of relationships involved (including horizontal, inverse vertical).

However, the ECJ has limited the application of consistent interpretation via general principles of law, in particular the principles of legal certainty and non-retroactivity and the interpretation of national law *contra legem*.

Direct effect: Direct effect means that individuals can directly invoke a provision of primary or secondary Union law in the national legal order, including before a court). Whether a provision has direct effect depends on three conditions: **1)** the EU legal instrument in which the provision is contained; **2)** the content of the provision; and **3)** the type of relationship involved.

Provisions of directives, as a rule, lack direct effect (ad 1), but they can have direct effect when they are sufficiently precise and unconditional (ad 2). Contrary to provisions of the Treaties and regulations, provisions of directives can only have direct effect in vertical relations and not in horizontal or inverse vertical relations (ad 3). However the latter was opened up for the so-called triangular relations in the case *Wells*, where Mrs. Wells (the plaintiff), appealed against a decision of a national public authority to grant a permit to a mining company (third party, here the permit holder), arguing that a provision of the EIA directive was breached by this decision (Case C-201/02). The ECJ decided that in such cases individuals can successfully invoke the direct effect of the provisions of directives, as they are then applied vertically and *not* horizontally or inverse vertically, as invoking the directive merely had adverse horizontal side-effects. The negative effects for the

mining company of the direct effect of the directive did not directly stem from the directive, but from the authorities' failure to fulfill its obligations under the directive.

When provisions in directives are not sufficiently precise and unconditional due to leaving a discretion to the Member States, they still can be applied by the national courts. The national court then must examine whether the national I public authority/legislator stayed within the margin of discretion left to the Member States in the EU law when exercising its powers (the so-called *Kraaijeveld*-test or legality review (Case C-72/95)). This test can perceived as a form of direct effect

During the implementation period: One final remark with regard to the mechanisms of consistent interpretation and direct effect is that they only apply with regard to directives once the period for transposition has expired. During the implementation period Member States 'must refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to compromise the attainment of the result prescribed by that directive'. The courts are to apply this test (the so-called *Inter-Environnement*-test (Case C-129/96)). The ECJ has applied it also for other transitional regimes in directives.

State liability: When the former two mechanisms fails and a provision of a directive cannot used by the national court via consistent interpretation or direct effect, state liability is the mechanism of last resort. But the European principle of state liability (also known as Francovich-liability (Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90)) can also be used as a separate mechanism to remedy infringements of Union law, such as the failure to implement directives correctly (transpose, apply, enforce). State liability of a Member State covers infringements by all the national authorities, including violation of EU law by the highest national courts (Köbler, Case C-224/01). The ECJ has set minimum- criteria, under which a Member State is to be considered liable before a national court. The criteria of the European principle of state liability for failure to implement directives are three-fold. Required are a) a sufficient serious breach of Union law; b) of a rule intended to confer rights on individuals; and c) a direct causal link between breach and damage. Except for the criteria as such (the right to reparation when the criteria are met), the EU mechanism of state liability must be applied (given effect) within the national procedural framework, including how an action for a breach of EU law is classified, the exact nature or degree of the infringement required for state liability, and the extent of reparation. Yet this national procedural framework is subject to the EU limitations of equivalence and effectiveness (see par. 4). When found liable, Member States are required to make good damages caused to individuals through implementation failures. Although reparation must cover the loss or damage sustained so as to ensure effective protection, the national law on liability provides the framework within which the State must mate reparation for the consequences of the loss and damage caused, provided this is in accordance with the aforementioned EU limitations

2.2 Questions on the application of the EU mechanisms to apply EU directives

13. Please estimate how often your court considered an EU environmental directive not or incorrectly implemented, differentiating between the 3 elements of implementation (transposition/application/enforcement) in the cases in which EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012?

Transposition: rarely
Application: rarely
Enforcement: regularly

If possible, please illustrate the judicial practice and reasoning used to verify the implementation of EU law (for example via a sketch of a typical national environmental case)

In Finland, directives are normally transposed (on time) and typically national implementing legislation also includes the essence of the Directive. However, in some cases the implementation leaves a margin of interpretation which may be incorrectly applied by authorities and Courts. One rare example of an incorrect (missing!) transposition is Art. 6(2) of the Habitats Directive, whose different role from 6(3-4) has not been fully recognized. One example of an incorrect enforcement has been linked to Annex II of the EIA Directive. Previous case law was based on the idea that if the competent administrative authority had not ordered an EIA to be done, the Courts had no power to overrule that decision. Traces of the previous interpretation are still visible in some cases of the SAC, when lower Courts have not noticed the present line of interpretation empowering the Courts to challenge also the so called 0-decisions of the EIA authority.

- 14. Please indicate as an estimate over the total number of cases of your court where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012, which of the three mechanisms was/were applied by your court in case of a non or incorrect implementation of (environmental) directives?
 - **a.** Consistent interpretation:

10-25%

b. Direct effect (including the 'Kraaijeveld-test'):

0-1%

c. State liability:

0-1%

d. During the transposition/ transitional periods: the 'Inter-Environnement test'

1-10%

e. Differently, namely

0-1%; 1-10%; 10-25%; 25-50%; 50-75%; 75-90%; 90-100%; 100%

- 15. In general, do you use one or more of these mechanisms within one case?
 - o One mechanism, or
 - x Multiple mechanisms

Please explain Consistent interpretation is always used as a starting point in interpreting national law based on Directives; if the wording of the provision and established practice under national law in question does not enable the directive-conform interpretation, direct effect is used if its preconditions are at hand

- 16. In general, if any, what is your court's order of preference:
 - x Consistent interpretation/direct effect
 - Direct effect/consistent interpretation
 - Consistent interpretation/direct effect/state liability
 - Direct effect/consistent interpretation/state liability
 - O Differently, namely

If possible, please indicate what the particular legal & practical arguments are for your court's order of preference ... Consistent interpretation can be used in all types of cases and relationships and when applying vague environmental law provisions It often leads to the interpretation comparing the purpose of the Directive; the preconditions for direct effect in the classical understanding are much more strict; the role state liability cases in Administrative Courts is a little bit obscure and under some reconsideration (it is not

	kable that Administrative Courts wou	•	=
_	ions under EU Law has been breache		-
	where the State is the defendant), Ho	•	supplement of the system: the
main ru	ule shall be the correct application of		
not a.	es your court use directives when the yet passed (including when the case During the transposition period During other transitional periods (su	concerns 'infringements' of these of	
	, please explain, if possible, why and		oning used in such cases:
Why:	To guarantee the effet utile.		
			How: When the
directiv this bas	of appreciation of the national law a ve, the interpretation can be matched sed on the vertical relationship, and e	d to the new state of legislation (of established practice in some	course there are restrictions to
• • •	, please also indicate, as an estimate, 1 January 2011- 1 January 2012 in wl		al cases of your court in the
0-1%			
co th	That concrete legal options (judicial doncludes, on the basis of the EU mechale EU obligation to set aside any nationallable to you and indicate for which	nanisms, that a EU directive was broonal rule that conflicts with EU law?	eached, in particular in view of
You	ur court is allowed to:		
0	to set aside (not apply) the conflict	ing national rule	
		consistent interpretation; direct e	effect;(EU) state liability
0	to declare that EU law was breache	ed	
		consistent interpretation; direct e	effect;(EU) state liability
0	to force the legislature to act		
		NO, of course a decision by the Co	urt may lead to legislative
	amendn	nents, but we cannot FORCE them	
	 give an order to adopt leg 	islation	
	o give order to act in a speci	ific way	
0	to annul decisions		
		consistent interpretation; direct e	effect;
0	to revoke a consent already grante	•	
		consistent interpretation; direct e	effect;
0	to suspend a consent already grant	•	
		consistent interpretation; direct e	effect;

(EU) state liability (?, unsettled but not unthinkable)

o to award damages

	0	monetary compensatio	n
			consistent interpretation; direct effect; (EU) state liability
	0	factual reparation	
			consistent interpretation; direct effect;(EU) state liability
0	to offer	rinterim relief	
			consistent interpretation; direct effect
0	to alter	(break through) national	exhaustive mandatory assessment systems, for instance by widening
		austive number of ground	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		8	consistent interpretation; direct effect (?, in triangular
		relati	onships probably, in pure vertical probably not)
0	differer		onships productly, in pure vertical productly noty
O	unierer	itty	consistant interpretation, direct effect //EII) state liability
			consistent interpretation; direct effect/(EU) state liability
	-	ncerning state liability se	e also under
2.3 Que	estions or	n the application of cons	istent interpretation
19. Pro	position:	the mechanism of consis	tent interpretation is an advantageous principle.
l strong	ly agree		
20. Doe request	-	ourt also use the mechan	ism of consistent interpretation <i>ex officio</i> (when parties did not Yes
			nechanism of consistent interpretation considered non usable by your
court in	the case	es where EU law was at is	sue in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012?
			Never, as far as I can remember, but if yes, probably due to
contra	legem int	terpretation	
# When	the med	:hanism of consistent inte	erpretation was considered <i>non usable</i> in these cases, this was due to:
0	the nrin	nciple of legal certainty	Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always
	-	eneral principles of law	Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always
0	•	·	
0	contra i	legem interpretation	Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always
0	the par	ties involved:	
	0	because the national pu	ublic authority relied on consistent interpretation of the directive to
		the detriment of a citize	en, where there was no formal third party:
			Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always
	0	because the national pr	ublic authority relied on consistent interpretation of the directive to
		the detriment of a citize	en, where there was a formal third party:
			Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always
	0	in criminal proceedings	, when consistent interpretation would have had the effect of
	· ·	, -	ting, directly the liability in criminal law:
		determining or aggrava	Never, rarely, regularly, mainly, always
_	difforce	atially namely	
0	umerer	ntially, namely	
# If pos	sible, ple	ase illustrate the reasons	s why consistent interpretation was not usable (the limitations)
See abo)Ve		

2011-1	an estimate, in how many of the cases of your court where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January January 2012, did your court use interpretations of EU law by other national courts, including those of Member States?
0	Use of interpretation by other courts of your country 0-1% Use of interpretation by national courts of other Member States 1-10%
# Pleas	e, if possible, illustrate when in particular the <i>latter</i> was the case.
States I	en interpreting the concept of waste or when deciding locus standi; to se how Courts in other Member nave applied EU
	e indicate whether there is a <i>need for information</i> on the interpretations of EU law by national courts of Member States? Yes
2.4 Que	estions on the application of direct effect
23.	Propositions:
0	The mechanism of direct effect is an advantageous principle.
l a	gree
0	The criteria to establish whether or not a provision has direct effect are workable?
ne	utral
	ase estimate how often your court establish the direct effect of provisions in a directive on the case law r courts, in the case law where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012,
0	Use of case law of other courts of your country
	Never?
0	Use of case law of national courts of other Member States
	Never?
# Pleas	e, if possible, illustrate when in particular the latter is the case.
	e indicate whether there is a <i>need for information</i> on the use of direct effect of EU environmental law onal courts of other Member States? Yes

25. How often, as an estimate, did your court apply the mechanism of the *Kraaijeveld*-test (to examine whether the national public authorities stayed within the margin of discretion of provisions of directives) in the cases where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012?

rarely

26. How often, as an estimate, was the mechanism of direct effect considered non usable by your court in the cases where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012?

rarely

If the mechanism of consistent interpretation (probably you mean **direct effect**?) was considered non usable in these cases, please indicate the reasons *why*:

Reason of legal certainty:

never

Prohibition of inverse direct effect (national public authority versus individual (incl. company/NGO)):

rarely

Prohibition of horizontal direct effect (individual versus individual):

never

Adverse horizontal side-effects of direct effect (Wells)

never

Differentially, namely

If possible, please illustrate these reasons (the limitations), in particular of restrictions related to triangular situations (e.g. where the plaintiff (an individual) appeals, relying on EU law, against a decision of a national public authority granting a permit to another individual (the (in-) formal third party)

As indicated above, consistent interpretation most often allows a correct application of EU Law. For extreme cases, direct effect is in the tool box. Personally, I am not any longer sure whether consistent interpretation and direct effect or (objective) direct application of a Directive can be clearly separated from each other. The wordings of environmental law provisions are typically leave so much room for interpretation and interpretations are often based an a case-by-case assessment that EU Law can be fully applied. It is irrelevant where the borderline between interpretative effect and direct effect is drawn. Even if the criteria of the classical direct effect doctrine are established, I can hardly think about a situation where national law would not allow an interpretation required by EU Law, irrespective of whether the relationship is vertical, hisontal or triangular (inverse vertical relationship in criminal cases excluded).

- 27. Would you limit the use of the mechanism of direct effect by a national public authority in a case between this authority and a company, regarding the refusal of this authority to grant an environmental permit to this company, based -ex officio- directly on a provision in a directive, when there are potentially, but not formally third parties, involved?
- 28. Would your court ex officio apply a provision of a directive that has direct effect (is sufficiently clear and precise) in a case where there are potentially third parties (such as NGOs protecting general interest of the environment) but none of these parties is formally party to the case?

Yes

2.5 Questions on	the application	of State liability
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29. Proposition: the mechanism of EU state liability is an advantageous mechanism.				
I agree				
30. Is there also a national instrument of state liability for violations of EU law?	? no			
There is no specific instrument, but damages can be awarded to plaintiffs wh have suffered loss from e.g. incorrect implementation of EU Law; in my opini damages can and shall be awarded at least under the same criteria as establi at the moment it is not settled if the application for damages shall be heard instance or a regional Administrative Court (so called administrative litigatio probably be an important decision by the SAC in the near future	ion it should be clear that ished in application of EU Law; by a General Court of first			
# If yes, how often, as an estimate, was the national instrument of state liabilit where EU law was at issue in the period 1 January 2011- 1 January 2012?	ry used by your court in the cases			
0-1%				
# If yes, please respond to the following proposition: I prefer the national inst EU mechanism.	trument of state liability over the			
I strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree.				
# Please indicate why:				
 Less stringent criteria More stringent criteria More clarity criteria Experience Request parties Differentially, 				
# Please explain: See above				
31. In general, has the EU mechanism (or national instrument) of state liability infringements of EU law by national courts for their judicial decisions (Köbler) is				
# If yes,				
did these judicial decisions concern environmental cases?did they ever concern your court's judicial decisions?	no no			
# If possible, please illustrate				
32. Has an action based on the EU mechanism of state liability for an infrancessful in the environmental case law of your court?	ringement of EU law ever been			

If no,

 has an action based on the *national* instrument of state liability for an infringement of EU law ever been successful in the environmental case law of *your court*?

no

by your knowledge, has an action based on the EU mechanism of state liability ever been successful in the environmental case law of your country?

don't know

by your knowledge, has as an action based on the *national* instrument of state liability for infringements of *national law* in environmental case law ever been successful in *your country*?

don't know

33. Does your court require from individuals (incl. companies/NGO's) that they minimize the damages they claim via a state liability action, meaning that they first should have relied on directly effective provisions of EU law in for instance an administrative procedure (make use of the legal remedies available)?

Yes (?)

Part. 3. The (non)use of the preliminary procedure

3.1 Introduction of EU legal framework

The relationship between the EU courts, the ECJ and the national (environmental) courts, is codified in art. 267 TFEU (art. 234 TEC) on the preliminary procedure. When national courts encounter problems with the application of EU law they can or must request the ECJ for an interpretation of EU law, when the national court 'deems such an interpretation [of primary or secondary EU law] necessary for deciding a specific case'. The preliminary procedure may also concern the legality of secondary EU law as national courts are not allowed to rule on the legality of secondary EU law. Courts whose decisions can be appealed, have discretion to use the preliminary procedure, but national courts of last resort must refer. The national courts of last resort are merely relieved from this obligation to refer in case of: an *acte clair* or *acte éclaire*, being if the EU law is sufficiently clear respectively the legal issue has already been addressed by the ECJ (*Cilfit*, Case 283/81). Non-reference by the national court in last resort can result in EU state liability (*Köbler*).

3.2 Questions on the application of the preliminary procedure

34. Proposition: the preliminary procedure is a very useful.

I agree				

35. How many references for preliminary rulings were made in environmental cases in your country in the period 1 January 2008-1 January 2012? ...2 (at least)....

How many of these references where made by your court? ...2.....

36. What type(s) of preliminary questions were referred by your court?

Questions on:

- o the interrelation between procedural law (procedural autonomy) and EU law
- o the use of the EU mechanisms of application of EU law

X	material (environmental) EU law (for instance on interpretation provisions)	, the interrelation between EU legal
0	differently namely,	
	ease estimate in how many of the cases of your court where EU law 1 January 2012, did the parties ask your court to request a prelimina	
1-10%	% or 10-25%	
	en these requests are turned down, are the reasons always stated in decision)?	the ruling (for instance in a separate Yes/no
is turr	ons are always stated, at least at a general level in the final decision on the decision of th	n is not at all based on EU Law)
38. 2008-	Has your court ever withdrawn preliminary references in enviror 1 January 2012?	nmental cases in the period 1 January
# In th	nis period have your court's preliminary questions been:	
	 left unanswered by the ECJ? rephrased your court's preliminary questions in such a way that they were no longer relevant for the referring case? 	no
# If ye	es, please indicate the number of cases where this occurred, and, if p	oossible, illustrate
hower opera adopt	Iti Energia case (C-317/07 and C-209/09) the first ruling was somewher, the reference was not made because of unclarity etc., but becautor. The final ruling was clear by the result but its merits might be seed in the first ruling	use of change in the plans of the een different from the line of thinking
39. althou	Does your court wait for the 'perfect' case to refer a (number of) ugh the legal questions concerning EU law are already raised in othe	
		no (in principle)
# If po	ossible, please explain,	
	ourt is the supreme instance and we have a duty to refer the case, it Of course, we can select the best suitable case from those pending.	
	hen a question requiring preliminary ruling is raised in a certain cas edings:	e does your court stay the
C		Yes Yes

0	by other courts of your country:	Yes
0	by courts of other countries:	Yes
41.	Can the national (environmental) court always use the preliminary ruling in	the referring case? Yes
42. Doe	s your court use are the preliminary rulings beyond the referring cases?	Yes
	es your court use the preliminary rulings based on referrals by other courts, in states?	ncluding those of other Yes
	you ever in hindsight incorrectly decide not to refer a preliminary question to red the Union law was irrelevant for the case or the relevant Union law was a	
# If yes	, did it give rise to an (EU) action of state liability (Köbler-claim)?	no
# Would	d you be able, according to national (procedural) law to repair such a court de	ecision? Yes
#If poss	ible, please explain,	
	g extraordinary means of	

Does your court stay the proceedings in a case when there are—for that case relevant- preliminary questions

Part 4. The interrelation between national procedural autonomy and EU (environmental) law

4.1 Introduction of the EU legal framework

referred:

The application of EU (environmental) law by national courts occurs within the context of national procedural law. National procedural law regulates *inter alia* the access to the court, the burden of proof, the intensity of judicial review, and the remedies offered by these courts. National procedural law however faces EU restrictions, as the national procedural law of 27 Member States —potentially — distorts the application of EU law.

These restrictions can be found in formal harmonization in EU law, for instance the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus), and in case law of the ECJ. The proposed directive to implement the so-called third-pillar of Aarhus, on access to justice, has (still) not been adopted, but it has been implemented in part, particularly in the context of the EIA and IPPC-directives (2003/35/EC and 2003/4/EC). Recently landmark cases on Aarhus clearly limited the procedural autonomy on access to justice in environmental law. Specific harmonization can also be found in the Eco crime- and Eco liability-directives (2008/99/EC and 2004/35/EC).

In so far as there is no harmonization the general restrictions of the national procedural autonomy apply. These three general restrictions, which are principles based on standard ECJ case law, form the outer boundaries of national procedural law in 'EU law'- cases. There are the two 'mild' *Rewe*-principles, consisting of a) **the principle of equivalence**: national rules cannot be applied if they are less favorable if applied to cases involving the application of EU law than to comparable cases concerning only national law; and b) **the principle**

of effectiveness: national rules cannot be applied if they make it (practically) impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law (Case 33/76). Violations of the principle of effectiveness can be justified by general principles of law such as legal certainty and the rights of defense (the so-called procedural 'rule of reason' or balancing test). The third restriction is **the principle of effective legal protection**, which requires an effective access to a court *as well* as an adequate system of remedies in place in the Member States in order to give effect to EU law (codified in article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and art. 19 TEU). This final principle has on occasion also resulted in new types of legal remedies.

National courts will have to check whether these principles restrict the application of national procedural rules in the cases before them (check if 'EU-proof'). The case law of the ECJ on the restrictions of national procedural law covers a wide range of procedural rules, varying from the access to justice (e.g. standing requirements, time limits, ex officio application of EU law), the burden of proof, the intensity of judicial review, and the remedies (types of court procedures and the types of legal effects). Several uncertainties however still remain with regard to the aforementioned restrictions, for instance on the relationship between the *Rewe* principles and the 'intensive' principle of effective legal protection; the role of the procedural rule of reason, as well as legal consequences of a breach of the restrictions, except for the *Simmenthal*-duty to set them aside.

4.2 Questions on the application of EU restrictions of the procedural autonomy

45. Please estimate in how many of the cases of your court in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012 where EU law was at issue, did the EU restrictions of the national procedural autonomy play a role:

1-10%

46. Please estimate in how many of the cases of your court in the period 1 January 2011-1 January 2012 where EU law was at issue did you consider any national procedural rule **not** to be 'EU-proof'

0-1%;

If possible, please specify which of following restrictions played a role in this case law:

- o The principle of equivalence
- The principle of effectiveness
- x The principle of effective legal protection
- x Aarhus (including the Aarhus-case law by the ECJ)
- Secondary legislation:
 - o Directive 2003/4 (Access to info)
 - x Directive 2003/35 (Public participation)
 - Eco-liability directive 2004/35
 - o Eco-crime directive 2008/99
- European Convention on Human Rights
- Differently,

Please illustrate the relevant generally used legal considerations in your case law:

NGO's access to Court in cases where n	national (procedural)) law does not explicitly at	ford them locus
standi			

47. As an estimate in how many of the cases referred to in question 57 (46?) did you find a justification for the use of the procedural rule? (you mean the national procedural rule which was not EU proof)?

\mathbf{a}	1	0/
υ	-1	.70

Please specify the justification you found (use)?

	0	the procedural rule of reason (general principles of law) legal certaintyrights of defense	
	0	differently,	
		ur knowledge of <i>current</i> national (procedural) law that is/could be infrin , with regard to:	ging the EU
	a. ad	cess to justice:	maybe
		x standing requirements:	
		o time limits:	
		o court fees,	
		length of proceedings:	
		o ex officio application of EU law	
	0	the intensity of judicial review and	no
	0	burden of proof	no
	0	legal remedies:	no/maybe
		o types of judicial review (legal review or claims solely based o	·
		• the judicial competences (the types of judgments/decision in	· ·
		deliver (sanctioning/legal redress) & aim of judicial review: for instance	e dispute settlement ?
	0	differently,	
# To your k	nowle	edge is there any <i>future</i> national (procedural) law that could infringe the no	e EU restrictions?
# If yes, ple	ase e	xplain	
49. Accordi	ing to	the ECJ case law on the national procedural law a <i>national competence</i> ur view what has the impact been of this case law on your court's enviro	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

If judges from different courts from the same member state are participating each of them can fill in the questionnaire as his or her court is concerned

If possible, please illustrate...It is clear that EU Law in to a very large extent implemented by national

EU Law), but the impact of the case law concretizing this principle not so big

authorities and national courts. The effect of this principle is very big (judges feel themselves also guardians of

Please send your answers to the general rapporteur Ms. Liselotte Smorenburgvan Middelkoop as soon as possible and **on September 10**th **at the latest**

(answers received after that date cannot be incorporated in het general report): L.vanMiddelkoop@uva.nl